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AbstrAct
Judges decide complex cases in rapid succession but are limited by cognitive constraints. 
Consequently judges cannot allocate equal attention to every aspect of a case.  Case 
outcomes might thus depend on which aspects of a case are particularly salient to the 
judge.  Put simply, a judge focusing on one aspect of a case might reach a different 
outcome than a judge focusing on another.  In this Article, we report the results of a 
series of studies exploring various ways in which directing judicial attention can shape 
judicial outcomes.  In the first study, we show that judges impose shorter sentences 
when information concerning the cost of incarceration is made available to them.  In 
the second study, we demonstrate that judges assess the credibility of expert witnesses 
more favorably when lawyers present an additional expert with similar, albeit notably 
weaker, credentials.  In the third study, we show that the format in which prosecutors 
present forensic testimony can alter judges’ assessments of that testimony’s probative 
value.  Finally, in the fourth study, we demonstrate that judges’ willingness to ignore 
inadmissible evidence in a criminal case is affected by both the gravity of the crime and 
the severity of the police misconduct.  In each of these studies, varying the context in 
which judges review evidence or altering the form in which that evidence is presented 
shifts judges’ attention and alters their decisions.
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It’s all about the choreography of people’s attention . . . . Attention is 
like water.  It flows.  It’s liquid.  You create channels to divert it, and 
you hope that it flows the right way.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The “Last Resort Rule” advises lawyers that: “If you have the facts on your 
side, hammer the facts.  If you have the law on your side, hammer the law.  If you 
have neither the facts nor the law, hammer the table.”2  The aphorism states 
the obvious, perhaps.  But it also identifies a talent that superior lawyers gen-
erally possess—the ability to change the terms of the debate so as to win a case 
that cannot otherwise be won.  We suspect that judges dislike this aphorism, 
because it suggests that lawyers’ efforts to control the courtroom agenda can 
successfully redirect a judge’s attention from the essence of a case.  Judges want to 
make just and accurate decisions.  The possibility that lawyers can trick them into 
making an erroneous ruling through superficial changes in terminology or by 
introducing red herrings is unsettling. 
As unsettling as it might be to judges, the Last Resort Rule might be sound 
advice.  The Rule dovetails with a fundamental lesson from social psychology con-
cerning how to influence people’s judgment.  Psychologists Lee Ross and Richard 
Nisbett assert that persuasion often occurs by changing the “object of judgment, 
not the judgment of the object.”3  That is to say, it is easier to redirect people’s 
attention than to change their minds. 
A famous experiment conducted by psychologist Solomon Asch illustrates 
this point.4  Asch gave eight undergraduates the seemingly innocuous task of iden-
  
1. Adam Green, A Pickpocket’s Tale: The Spectacular Thefts of Apollo Robbins, NEW YORKER, Jan. 7, 
2013, at 38, 41 (quoting Apollo Robbins, theatrical pickpocket and magician). 
2. Morton L. Janklow, You Can Be Persuasive, PARADE MAG., Dec. 29, 1985, at 8, 10.  
3. LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES 
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 69 (1991) (“[P]eople’s responses to an object are often less reflective of 
their long-held attitudes and values than of the way they happen to construe the ‘object of 
judgment’ on a given occasion.”).  Ross and Nisbett attribute this observation to Solomon Asch.  
SOLOMON E. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 424 (1952) (“[T]here has been no change of evalu-
ation, but rather a change in that which is being evaluated.  The fundamental fact involves a change 
in the object of judgment, rather than in the judgment of the object.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).    
4. S. E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in READINGS 
IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2, 3–6 (rev. ed. 1952) (describing the experiment and its results); see also 
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tifying which of three lines of notably different lengths was closest in length to a 
target line.  The target line was identical in length to one of the three options, 
making the task seem incredibly easy—at least until the first seven participants 
chose the wrong line.  In actuality, participant number eight was the only real 
subject in the experiment.  The others were confederates of the experimenter who 
had been instructed to choose the wrong line.  The real subjects commonly went 
along with the group’s choice, even though it seemed erroneous.  Although this 
study is often described as an illustration of the power of conformity,5 it actually 
demonstrates how changing the object of judgment can alter behavior.  The sub-
jects did not conform to the group’s choice because they were uncertain of the rel-
ative length of the lines.  Rather, they conformed because they believed that if the 
others had chosen an answer that seemed obviously wrong, then the subjects must 
have misunderstood either the instructions or some other aspect of the task.6  In 
effect, the seven confederates’ confident but plainly erroneous answers changed 
the object of the subjects’ judgment, transforming the task from one of visual 
perception into one of social perception and thereby altering the subjects’ choices. 
Advertisers have long taken advantage of the insight that consumer judgment 
can be influenced by similar kinds of misdirection of attention.7  Tobacco com-
panies, for example, produced cigarette advertisements promoting youth and hipness, 
not smoking.8  Clothing lines and retailers market images of youth and beauty, not 
clothing.  Beer commercials featuring attractive young people are quite trans-
parently selling sex, not beer. 
In this Article, we explore whether judges in courtrooms react like experi-
mental subjects in psychological studies and like consumers confronted by 
Madison Avenue marketing tactics.  We report the results of four experiments, 
each of which explores whether irrelevant context can redirect judges’ attention 
and thereby alter their judgments.  In the first study, we show that judges impose 
shorter sentences when information concerning the cost of incarceration is made 
available to them.  In the second study, we demonstrate that judges assess the 
credibility of an expert witness more favorably when lawyers offer an additional 
  
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537, 1551–53 (2000) 
(discussing interpretations of Asch’s study). 
5. See ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 3, at 33 (stating that the interpretation of Asch’s research as 
showing that “people are sheep” represents the “conventional view” of this research). 
6. See Lee Ross et al., The Role of Attribution Processes in Conformity and Dissent: Revisiting the Asch 
Situation, 31 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 148, 149–50 (1976) (describing the dilemma of subjects in 
the Asch experiment as a difficulty with explaining the behavior of their peers). 
7. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market 
Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1432–33 (1999) (discussing the efforts of advertisers to 
misdirect the public). 
8. See id. at 1467–1552 (discussing advertising in the tobacco industry). 
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expert with similar, albeit notably weaker, credentials.  In the third, we show that 
the format in which prosecutors present forensic testimony can alter judges’ assess-
ments of that testimony’s probative value.  Finally, we demonstrate that both the 
gravity of the crime and the severity of police misconduct affect judges’ wil-
lingness to ignore inadmissible evidence in a criminal case. 
Each of these experiments relies on data that we collected from judges at-
tending judicial education conferences at which one or more of us made a presen-
tation.  Because we used presentation titles that were generic (“judicial decision 
making” was typical) the judges were not aware of what we were studying.  Fur-
thermore, most of our sessions were not optional parts of the program, so we are 
confident that judges did not select our session out of interest in psychology.  At the 
outset of each presentation, we asked the judges to respond to a multipage survey.  
The surveys included several questions, most of which asked the judges to rule on 
hypothetical cases.  As we describe below, the judges were randomly assigned 
to one of up to six slightly different versions of each case, enabling us to 
conduct between-subject experiments.  We informed the judges that responding 
to the surveys was voluntary and that their responses would be anonymous.  We 
did request, however, that the judges provide demographic information at the end 
of the survey, including their title (to ensure that they were a judge), their years of 
experience as a judge, their general political orientation (Republican, Democrat, 
or other), and their gender.9  We also afforded judges the opportunity to com-
plete the survey for pedagogic purposes but to exclude the use of the survey in any 
further research.  Nearly all of the judges who attended our presentations com-
pleted the voluntary survey and authorized us to use their results in the research 
described below.  In each session, we compiled the results quickly and presented 
aggregated results back to the judges who had completed the surveys. 
  
9. We have successfully used this methodology for over a decade.  See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking 
on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2007) [hereinafter 
Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench]; Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 777, 786–87 (2001); Chris Guthrie et al., Judging by Heuristic: Cognitive Illusions in 
Judicial Decision Making, 86 JUDICATURE 44, 45–46 (2002); Chris Guthrie et al., The “Hidden 
Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1492–94 
(2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Contrition in the Courtroom: Do Apologies Affect Adjudication?, 
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1189 (2013); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect 
Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1205–06 (2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., 
Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1232 (2006); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et 
al., Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 72, 76–78 (2011) 
[hereinafter Rachlinski et al., Probable Cause]; Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 
1281–84 (2005); Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong 
Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571 (2013). 
Attention In Adjudication 1591 
 
 
I. TRUTH IN SENTENCING 
Decades ago, economist Gary Becker argued that societies should try to op-
timize the costs and benefits of incarceration.10  To Becker, the benefits consist 
largely of deterrence, while the costs include the lost productivity associated with 
confinement and, of course, the cost of prison infrastructure.11  Most scholars, 
judges, and the public, however, believe that criminal sentences should be based 
on retributive goals rather than Becker’s utilitarian goals.12  That is, when judges, 
jurors, and most citizens assess criminal sentences, they likely weigh the crime 
committed, the defendant’s criminal history, the defendant’s personal history, 
and the attitude the defendant expresses towards the crime and the victims.13  The 
cost of incarceration is not typically a factor.  Although legislatures might con-
sider such concerns in setting sentencing ranges,14 the cost of incarceration typi-
cally plays no direct role in sentencing hearings.15 
  
10. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 170 (1968) 
(“The optimal amount of enforcement is shown to depend on, among other things, the cost of 
catching and convicting offenders, the nature of punishments—for example, whether they are fines 
or prison terms—and the responses of offenders to changes in enforcement.”). 
11. See id. at 170–72; see also David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: A Cost-Benefit Approach to 
Incarceration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 905, 946–52 (2013) (analyzing the direct and indirect costs of 
incarceration). 
12. See Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
37, 39 (2006) (discussing the factors that may appropriately be considered in imposing sentence); 
Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 821 (2007) 
(discussing whether the criminal justice system should consider social consequences when 
determining a sentence). 
13. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 32 (1998) (“[T]he notion 
that suffering of the offender can negate the suffering caused by the offense continues to resonate in 
our intuitions of justice.”); id. at 38 (“According to the ethics of the Bible, those who ‘stand idly by’ 
are charged with blood guilt.  Similarly today, we are inclined to see the failure to punish as a form 
of complicity that falls on those who abandon the victim to his or her ‘private’ tragedy.”); see also 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (identifying factors used in federal sentencing). 
14. Of course, sentencing costs could be incorporated into the sentencing process in other ways.  For 
example, the aggregate costs of sentencing could be summarized in a criminal justice system’s an-
nual report.  That method, however, would not make the information salient to judges at the time 
of sentencing, thus making it difficult for them to use in determining particular sentences.  The fact 
that the state spent millions of dollars on its department of corrections tells the judge nothing about 
what a particular sentence will cost or how the cost of one sentence compares to that of another.  
Similarly, a state could reclassify some crimes to make them ineligible for incarceration or adjust 
sentencing guidelines to reduce recommended sentences.  See Abrams, supra note 11, at 913–14.  
This approach would obviate the need for judges to contemplate relative sentencing costs, as such 
consideration would occur on a system-wide level.  Judges might nonetheless continue to consider 
these costs, even if directed to ignore them.  See Wistrich et al., supra note 9, at 1275–76. 
15. Chad Flanders, Cost and Sentencing: Some Pragmatic and Institutional Doubts, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 
164, 165 (2012) [hereinafter Flanders, Institutional Doubts] (“The goal of saving money seems to be 
a different kind of goal than the traditional penological ones of preventing, deterring, and justly 
punishing crime.”); id. at 166 (“Cost, considered solely as the financial cost of a punishment, is 
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In one state, however, attention to the social costs of incarceration has come 
to play a more prominent role in sentencing in recent years.16  Concerned about 
the impact of a swelling prison population on the state budget, Missouri took 
steps to reduce the state’s ineffective reliance on incarceration.17  In 2010, the 
state began including information regarding the cost of various sentencing options 
in Sentence Advisory Reports (SARs) produced by the Missouri Sentencing Ad-
visory Commission (MOSAC) to assist judges in determining the appropriate 
sentence.18  For example, MOSAC announced that it would supply the sentenc-
ing judge with the following cost information for a hypothetical offender con-
victed of second-degree robbery, which carries a maximum sentence of fifteen years 
under Missouri law:  
Mitigating Sentence: Probation: 5 years probation @ $1,354 
per year. 
    Total Cost = $6,770 
  
largely exogenous to the traditional rationales for punishing people: rehabilitation, deterrence, and 
especially retribution.”).  Some federal courts of appeal have explicitly rejected the notion that the 
cost of a sentence should be considered in determining the appropriate sentence.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Molina, 563 F.3d 676, 678 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e doubt that sentencing courts have the 
authority to impose lesser sentences based on the cost of imprisonment.”); United States v. Tapia-
Romero, 523 F.3d 1125, 1126 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Congress has not made the cost to society of a 
defendant’s imprisonment a factor [that] a sentencing judge should consider under [18 U.S.C.] 
§ 3553(a) in determining the appropriate term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a).”); 
United States v. Wong, 127 F.3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 1997) (“The decision whether tax dollars 
should be used to pay for lengthy sentences is a congressional determination, not one to be made by 
federal courts.”).  Conversely, others have encouraged judges to consider cost as a factor, at least 
some of the time.  See Chad Flanders, Cost as a Sentencing Factor: Missouri’s Experiment, 77 MO. 
L. REV. 391, 395 (2012) [hereinafter Flanders, Missouri’s Experiment] (“Judges and attorneys may 
argue cost at sentencing hearings, and many of them do.”).  Notably, judges are provided with cost 
information in other criminal justice contexts.  For example, federal judges are encouraged to 
consider—along with the usual factors such as risk of danger to the community and risk of 
nonappearance—the relative cost of pretrial detention, release on bond, and various forms of 
postrelease monitoring. 
16. Monica Davey, Missouri Tells Judges Costs of Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2010, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/us/19judges.html (“Long missing [in the criminal justice system] 
has been a sober realization that even if we get significant benefits from incarceration, that comes 
at a significant cost.” (quoting Douglas A. Berman)); Heather Ratcliffe, Missouri Judges Get 
Penalty Cost Before Sentencing, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www. 
stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/missouri-judges-get-penalty-cost-before-sentencing/ 
article_924097a5-9f4d-54bb-80ca-4cc4160dde7c.html (reporting the view of Cathy Kelly of the 
Missouri Public Defender System that the “state is going bankrupt” and that judges need to know 
about “cost-effective options besides prison”). 
17. Apparently, Missouri is the only state that breaks down the cost of sentencing alternatives on a 
defendant-by-defendant basis.  See Ratcliffe, supra note 16 (“I don’t know of any state doing this 
except Missouri.” (quoting Barbara Tombs of the Washington, D.C., Sentencing Commission)). 
18. See Flanders, Missouri’s Experiment, supra note 15, at 391–92. 
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Presumptive Sentence: Community Structured Sentence: 5 years 
enhanced probation @ $1,792 per year. 
    Total Cost = $8,960 
Aggravating Sentence: Prison: 5 years prison assuming expected 
actual time served 62 percent = 3.1 years 
in prison @ $16,823 per year + remaining 
sentence of 1.9 years on parole @ $1,354 
per year.   
    Total Cost = $54,72419 
The attempt to make the cost of incarceration salient represents an inten-
tional shift of the sentencing paradigm from a retributive scheme to a social welfare 
scheme.20  Missouri’s system attempts to nudge judges to weigh social costs along 
with the usual retributive goals, just as Becker suggested decades ago.21  Missouri 
has conducted no analysis of the effects of this shift,22 however, and forecasts con-
flict.  Some have predicted that providing judges with information about the cost 
of sentences will reduce the length of sentences, while others have suggested that 
it will have little or no impact.23 
  
19. Sentencing Information on www.mosac.mo.gov Now Includes Costs of Recommended Sentences and Risks 
of Reincarceration, SMART SENT’G, Aug. 17, 2010, http://www.mosac.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=45502. 
20. Flanders, Missouri’s Experiment, supra note 15, at 393 (“The debate over the inclusion of cost 
figures in sentencing reports is part of the larger question of what factors are appropriate for a 
judge to consider when sentencing.  Should a judge include considerations of the social cost of 
certain forms of punishment when deciding a sentence, or does that mean the sentence is no lon-
ger tailored to the individualized facts of the crime and the criminal?  The question of including 
sentence cost also raises an issue central to modern retributivist theory: to what extent can the crim-
inal justice system and the various parties in it consider societal consequences in determining a 
sentence?  Should the right punishment be given to the offender, even if important social 
programs remain unfunded?” (footnotes omitted)). 
21. See Becker, supra note 10, at 207–09; Jeff Milyo, “Cost as a Sentencing Factor”: A Response, 77 MO. 
L. REV. 411, 414 (2012) (“By including sentencing costs in SARs, MOSAC is trying to nudge 
judges to issue less punitive sentences than they would if cost information was issued in an annual 
report.”); see also Davey, supra note 16 (“The intent behind the cost estimates . . . [Robert P. 
McCulloch, the prosecuting attorney for St. Louis County] said, is transparent: to pressure judges, 
in the face of big bills, into sending fewer people to prison.”). 
22. Telephone Interview by Irma Vargas of Julie Upschulte of MOSAC (Jan. 15, 2013). 
23. See Flanders, Institutional Doubts, supra note 15, at 167 (“The Commission is right to highlight 
the problems facing the criminal justice system, and the increasing cost of punishment has a good 
claim to be problem number one.  But it is an open question (in part, an open empirical question) 
whether letting judges use cost as a sentencing factor is the best way to go about trying to reduce 
the cost of criminal justice, and whether it will cause more harm than good.”); Flanders, Missouri’s 
Experiment, supra note 15, at 396 (“Jail time is expensive, as the Missouri Sentencing Commission 
shows, and if judges take into account cost, then they might lower sentences because they cost too 
much.  It is hard to imagine that a judge will increase a sentence in order to spend more money.  
Rather, a judge, knowing the cost of a longer sentence, would only be impelled to impose a longer 
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To attempt to answer this question, we asked 133 judges attending the 
annual meeting of the American Judges Association in September 2010 to sen-
tence a hypothetical defendant identified as “Hector Campbell, an unemployed 
drummer.”  The judges were split into two groups—one received a scenario 
charging Hector with possession of cocaine, while the second received a sce-
nario charging Hector with rape.  The materials indicated that “Hector is twenty-
four-years-old and has a high school diploma and a spotty employment record.”  
A complete copy of the materials is included as Appendix A. 
The first group of judges received materials stating that Hector had been 
“arrested at a party for allegedly possessing a two-ounce bag of cocaine.  Hector 
was charged with drug possession.  The evidence at trial, which included testi-
mony from an undercover police officer and two other witnesses, showed con-
vincingly that he had cocaine in his possession.”  These judges also learned that 
Hector had “one prior conviction for possession of marijuana” and that the 
maximum sentence for possession of cocaine under these circumstances was eight 
years. 
The second group’s materials stated that Hector “was arrested at a party for 
allegedly raping his ex-girlfriend at knifepoint.  Hector was charged with rape.  
The evidence at trial, which included testimony from the [ex-] girlfriend and two 
other witnesses, showed convincingly that he did commit the rape.”  These judges 
learned that Hector had “one prior conviction for assault and battery” and that 
the maximum sentence for rape under these circumstances was twenty-five years. 
To test the effect that providing the cost of incarceration might have on 
sentencing, we created three different versions of the hypothetical for each of the 
two types of crimes.  For one-third of the judges, we provided no information on 
the cost of incarceration.  For another third of the judges, the materials stated: 
“You have learned from your jurisdiction’s sentencing advisory commission that 
Hector’s incarceration will cost the state $15,500 per year or [$124,000/$387,500] 
if he were to serve a maximum sentence.”  For the final third of the judges, we 
  
sentence in spite of the greater cost of that sentence.  So the intuition that cost is an irrelevant fac-
tor naturally suggests that it would be wrong for a judge to decrease someone’s sentence or to give 
that person a different type of punishment than was appropriate because it would cost the state 
too much money.” (footnote omitted)).  But see Davey, supra note 16 (“This is one of a thousand 
things we look at—about the tip of a dog’s tail, it’s such a small thing.  But it is almost foolish not to 
look at it.  We live in a what’s-it-going-to-cost? society now.” (quoting Judge Gary Oxenhandler, 
presiding judge of the 13th Judicial Circuit Court of Missouri)); Ratcliffe, supra note 16 (“They are 
always happy to have more information. . . . But cost is not something they would consider when 
making a decision about sentencing.” (quoting Paul Fox, administrator for the St. Louis County 
Circuit Court)).   
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described the cost of incarceration as “$31,000 per year or [$248,000/$775,000] if 
he were to serve a maximum sentence.”24 
In effect, the materials created a 2x3, between-subjects design;25 judges re-
ceived either a drug possession case or rape case, and were provided with either no 
information on prison cost (the control condition), information that the cost 
would be $15,500 per year (low-cost condition), or information that the cost would 
be $31,000 per year (high-cost condition).  We asked all the judges to indicate what 
sentence they would impose on Hector.  Three judges did not provide a sentence, 
leaving 130 judges across six conditions. 
 
TABLE 1.  Average Sentence by Crime and Cost of Sentence Information (and N) 
Crime Cost of Sentencing InformationNone $15,500/year $31,000/year 
Possession 1.9 (15) 2.5 (24) 3.0 (22) 
Rape 16.7 (23) 18.0 (18) 12.4 (28) 
 
Table 1 reports the average sentence in each of the six conditions.  Analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) of the results revealed significant main effects of the type 
of crime,26 sentence cost information,27 and the interaction of crime and sentence 
cost information.28  To assess the meaning of the interaction term, we conducted 
separate ANOVAs on the two crimes.  This analysis revealed that the sentencing 
cost information had no significant effect on the sentences for possession.29  The 
sentence cost information, however, significantly affected the sentences the judges 
assigned in the rape case.30  Post hoc tests (Scheffe’s) showed that the average 
sentence in the high-cost condition was significantly lower than the average sen-
tence in the low-cost condition and significantly lower than the average sentence 
in the control condition; furthermore, the average sentences in the control con-
dition and in the low-cost condition did not differ significantly from each other. 
  
24. The costs we provide are realistic.  Two recent studies of the average cost of incarceration per 
inmate concluded that the national average was about $31,000, with the cost per state varying from 
a low of about $15,000 to a high of about $50,000.  See Abrams, supra note 11, at 946–47 (citing 
CHRISTIAN HENRICHSEN & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF 
PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS (2012) and PEW CTR. ON THE 
STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA (2008)). 
25. See ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 104 (2010). 
26.  (F(1, 124)=257.9, p < .001). 
27.  (F(2, 124)=3.44, p < .05). 
28.  (F(2, 124)=5.99, p < .005). 
29.  (F(2, 58)=0.93, p = .40). 
30.  (F(2, 66)=5.91, p < .005). 
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These results were surprising.  Like the architects of the Missouri experiment 
intended,31 and others had predicted,32 we expected that the victimless-crime 
aspect of the possession charge would make the judges more sensitive to the cost 
of incarceration, while the horror of the rape at knife point would maintain the 
judges’ focus on retributive ends.  Contrary to our expectations, however, the cost 
information had no impact on sentences in the drug possession scenario, even 
though the cost information strongly influenced sentencing in the rape scenario.  
Specifically, judges evaluating the rape scenario who were informed that incar-
ceration cost $31,000 annually imposed sentences that were roughly one-third 
shorter than the sentences imposed by judges who were told that the cost of 
incarceration was only $15,500.   
Two possibilities might account for this pattern of results.  First, the judges 
might have focused intently on the cost of sentencing when it was provided, as it 
is a novel fact for most judges.  Because the cost of incarceration in the rape case 
was so much larger than in the drug possession case, the sheer magnitude of the 
cost might have driven down sentences.  Secondly, the judges’ willingness to con-
sider cost information might have been at least partly attributable to the hypo-
thetical nature of our study.  The lack of detail and the absence of a real victim 
and defendant might have encouraged the judges to focus on cost considerations.  
Judges might be less influenced by cost information in actual cases, or they might 
even display the pattern that we originally predicted.   
Despite some uncertainty, these results suggest that providing information 
concerning the cost of incarceration can shift a judge’s focus away from the na-
ture of a crime and toward the direct financial cost of incarceration to society.  Al-
  
31. William Ray Price Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Mo., State of the Judiciary Address (Feb. 3, 
2010), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=36875 (“Let me be clear: violent of-
fenders need to be separated from us so they cannot hurt innocent men, women or children, 
regardless of the cost.  I am not talking about them.  I am talking about nonviolent offenders.”). 
32. See Flanders, Institutional Doubts, supra note 15, at 166 (suggesting the possibility that a judge “may 
use cost only in minor cases, and ignore cost altogether when it comes to violent offenses or serious 
property crimes”); id. at 165 (“Or consider another possibility.  Perhaps those cases where the cost 
savings would be the greatest are those cases where judges will be least likely to let cost make a 
difference.  More serious crimes, such as murder or armed robbery, would probably fall into this 
category.  For a judge sentencing in such a case, the idea that the cheaper sentence should win out 
because it is cheaper will seem anathema.  This could be another way in which cost will only do at 
best minimal work, because in the most serious cases, cases where the price difference between 
many years in prison and many years on probation is great, cost will be bracketed.  Only time and 
further study will tell if this is what happens.  But there seem to be some plausible reasons to doubt 
that the reform will have any but a modest impact on reducing the cost of sentences, or in making 
sentencing more cost effective.” (footnote omitted)). 
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though judges are aware that the state funds prisons, our study suggests that 
making the cost of incarceration salient can dramatically alter criminal sentences.33 
II. THE CONTRAST EFFECT 
Ugly Friend—A friend a person brings with him/her to a gathering/event 
in order to make him/herself appear more attractive in comparison.34 
 
The contrast effect is one of the most pervasive phenomena in the psychol-
ogical literature on judgment and choice.35  The addition of an extraneous item to 
a choice set can alter a person’s evaluation of the other items in that choice set by 
providing a misleading comparison set or contrast.36  For example, researchers in 
one study found that subjects were more likely to prefer receiving a Cross pen to a 
six-dollar payment when a clearly inferior pen was added to the choice set.37  Pre-
ferring the Cross pen to the six dollars or the six dollars to the Cross pen are both 
defensible choices, but one’s choice between those two options should not be 
altered by the availability of a clearly inferior option.  As one scholar put it, “a 
person who prefers chicken over pasta should not change this preference on learn-
ing that fish is also available.”38   
The contrast effect defies logic by violating what is known as the constant 
ratio rule, which states that “the relative proportion of choices made between 
two options should be the same regardless of whether they are presented on their  
own or in the presence of a third, less preferred option.”39  Thus, the contrast 
effect undermines the widely held assumption that preferences are invariant.40 
  
33. We note that our experiment does not perfectly track the Missouri experience, since the MOSAC 
also furnished judges with aggregate statistical information regarding the relative likelihood of 
recidivism following each type of sentence.  See Sentencing Information on www.mosac.mo.gov Now 
Includes Costs of Recommended Sentences and Risks of Reincarceration, supra note 19, at 1. 
34. Ugly Friend Definition (5), URB. DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term= 
ugly+friend (last visited July 17, 2013). 
35. See, e.g., Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness 
Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281, 281 (1992) (“Contrast effects are ubiquitous in perception 
and judgment.”). 
36. See id. at 282, 285–87 (“In deciding whether or not to select a particular option, people commonly 
compare it with other alternatives . . . .”). 
37. Id. at 287 (reporting results). 
38. Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 
287 (1996). 
39. Tanya Latty & Madeleine Beekman, Irrational Decision-Making in an Amoeboid Organism: 
Transitivity and Context-Dependent Preferences, 278 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y B 307, 308 (2010); see also 
Amos Tversky, Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice, 79 PSYCHOL. REV. 281, 292 (1972) (“The 
constant-ratio rule is a strong version of the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives.”). 
40. See Simonson & Tversky, supra note 35, at 281. 
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The contrast effect works by shifting attention.  When people choose between 
the Cross pen and six dollars, they are evaluating the Cross pen in terms of its 
cash value.  When the cheap pen becomes available, however, they assess the 
Cross pen in terms of its value as a pen compared to an inferior pen—which 
makes the Cross pen appear more valuable.41  People may not know whether they 
prefer a Cross pen or six dollars, but they do know that they prefer a Cross pen to a 
cheap pen.  Thus, the nature of the inquiry changes when the cheap pen is availa-
ble.  The contrast between the two pens provides a dimension on which the Cross 
pen is clearly superior.  People might be unsure whether the Cross pen is more 
useful than six dollars, but they can be certain that the Cross pen is more valuable 
than the cheap pen.  This contrast provides an additional basis for preferring the 
Cross pen to the six dollars.42 
The need to support and defend one’s choice is so powerful that people can 
be induced to pay more for less of a desirable commodity because of the way in 
which the commodity is presented.43  In one study, for example, one group of sub-
jects indicated that they would pay $2.26 for seven ounces of ice cream in a five-
ounce cup, while another group of subjects indicated that they would pay only 
$1.66 for eight ounces of ice cream in a ten-ounce cup.44  People were willing to 
pay more for less because an overflowing small cup of ice cream appeared to be a 
better deal than the underfilled large cup. 
The contrast effect has also been documented in legal settings.45  For example, 
researchers have found that defendants can induce plaintiffs to settle a case by 
presenting two settlement options, one of which is clearly inferior to the other 
(just as the availability of the inferior pen made the Cross pen seem more 
attractive).46  Similarly, a study by Sunstein, Kahneman, Schkade & Ritov showed 
that mock jurors will implicitly compare types of injuries in assigning punitive 
  
41. See Latty & Beekman, supra note 39; see also Tversky, supra note 39 (“The constant-ratio rule is a 
strong version of the principle of independence from irrelevant alternatives.”). 
42. See Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals 
Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 247, 249–55 (1996) (describing a series of studies showing that people 
evaluate items based on their easy-to-evaluate traits unless they are able to make a comparison to a 
similar item on a harder-to-evaluate trait). 
43. See Christopher K. Hsee, Less Is Better: When Low-Value Options Are Valued More Highly Than 
High-Value Options, 11 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 107, 108, 118 (1998) (presenting “a series 
of studies where a normatively less valuable option is judged more favorably than its more valuable 
alternative—a phenomenon to be referred to as the ‘less-is-better’ effect” and concluding that an 
easy-to-evaluate attribute will have a disproportionate effect on choice). 
44. Id. at 111–13. 
45. Kelman et al., supra note 38, at 297–99. 
46. Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora’s Box?: The Cost of Options in Negotiation, 88 IOWA L. REV. 601, 
620–21 (2003). 
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damages.47  In that study, subjects were asked to assign punitive damages in two 
different cases—one involving a particularly egregious financial crime and 
another involving minor physical injury.  The authors found that when subjects 
evaluated these cases separately they assigned higher punitive damage awards in 
cases of particularly egregious financial crimes than in cases of intentionally 
inflicted minor physical injuries.  This pattern reversed, however, when the sub-
jects evaluated both cases together.  The authors reasoned that when the subjects 
evaluated the cases separately, they implicitly compared each case to what they 
perceived as a typical version of the same type of injury.  Because the egregious 
financial harm was so much worse than the typical financial injury, it thus pro-
duced a high award.  Conversely, because the physical injury was relatively minor, 
it produced a low award.  Presenting both cases together, however, caused the 
subjects to recognize that the physical harm was more serious than the financial 
harm.  The subjects’ assignment of punitive damage awards matched this percep-
tion.  By presenting the cases together, rather than separately, the authors effec-
tively changed the comparison that the subjects were making and thereby changed 
the focus of the subjects’ attention. 
Are judges susceptible to the contrast effect?  Can they be induced to prefer the 
Cross pen and the ice cream in the smaller cup?  In a comment on the Kahneman, 
Schkade & Sunstein study, Eisenberg, Rachlinski & Wells showed that actual 
cases track the pattern that Kahneman et al.’s study suggests, in jury trials but not 
in bench trials.48  Because judges have much more experience in awarding damages 
than do lay jurors, they also apparently have a more stable sense of how to evaluate 
injuries. 
To explore further whether judges manage to resist the contrast effect, we 
asked Florida trial judges to evaluate a hypothetical case designed to elicit the 
phenomenon.  The judges were attendees at a statewide annual judicial education 
conference for Florida Circuit Court judges in June 2006.  Our materials asked 
the judges to evaluate the relative credibility of expert witnesses.  The scenario 
described a child-custody dispute as follows: 
Imagine that you are presiding over a child custody dispute in 
which the husband and wife are at odds over the custody of their 11-
year-old son, Jeremy.  The husband and wife are both competent par-
ents, but their relationship with each other is profoundly strained.  They 
have rejected a joint custody relationship and are each seeking sole cus-
tody of Jeremy (though the other parent would retain visitation rights).  
  
47. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1174–78 (2002). 
48. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Reconciling Experimental Incoherence With Real-World Coherence in Punitive 
Damages, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1239, 1245–56 (2002). 
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Both the husband and the wife have retained experts to testify as to 
the custodial arrangement that would serve Jeremy’s “best interests.”  
Based solely on the information provided below, which of the 
following experts would you deem to be most credible (please select 
one only): 
The materials then described the expert witnesses.  We randomly assigned 
the judges to one of two conditions: a control condition and a contrast condition.  
In the control condition, the judges chose between two experts—one working on 
behalf of the wife (Dr. Henry, a psychologist) and one on behalf of the husband 
(Dr. Williams, a psychiatrist)—who were designed to be of roughly comparable 
quality.  In the contrast condition, the judges chose from among those two experts 
(Dr. Henry and Dr. Williams) as well as a second expert retained by the husband 
(Dr. Hancock, a psychiatrist).  The additional expert retained by the husband (Dr. 
Hancock) was also a psychiatrist, but he had vastly inferior qualifications than the 
husband’s first expert (Dr. Williams).  He was, in other words, the equivalent of 
the cheap pen in this study. 
The materials described the two comparable experts as follows: 
Wife’s Expert—Dr. Henry is a licensed psychologist with a B.A. in Psych-
ology from Stanford and a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from the 
University of Michigan.  Dr. Henry has practiced as a clinical psychol-
ogist for 20 years in the District of Columbia, working primarily with 
children and families.  Dr. Henry has testified as an expert in 15 child 
custody cases, seven times for the wife and eight times for the husband.  
In this case, Dr. Henry will testify that the wife should get custody. 
Husband’s Expert—Dr. Williams is a licensed psychiatrist with a Bach-
elor’s Degree in Biology and an M.D. from Emory University.  Fol-
lowing medical school, Dr. Williams completed a psychiatric residency 
and has since practiced psychiatry for 10 years in the Miami area, 
working primarily with children and families.  Dr. Williams has testi-
fied as an expert in ten child custody cases, four times for the husband 
and six times for the wife.  In this case, Dr. Williams will testify that the 
husband should get custody. 
The husband’s additional expert, who was included only in the contrast con-
dition, was described as follows: 
Husband’s Expert—Dr. Hancock is a psychiatrist with a B.A. in Psych-
ology from the University of Mississippi and an M.D. from St. 
George’s University School of Medicine in Grenada.  Dr. Hancock has 
never been admitted to practice medicine in the United States.  Dr. 
Hancock has, however, testified as an expert in 37 prior child custody 
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cases, each time for the husband.  In this case, Dr. Hancock will testify 
that the husband should get custody. 
Of the 144 judges who reviewed this problem,49 six did not respond.50  None 
of the judges in the contrast condition identified the husband’s second psychiatrist 
(Dr. Hancock) as the most credible.  The addition of the weak expert, however, 
made the husband’s first psychiatrist (Dr. Williams) seem more credible.51  In the 
control condition, 54 percent (38 out of 70) of the judges identified the husband’s 
first psychiatrist (Dr. Williams) as more credible than the wife’s psychologist.  In 
the contrast condition, however, 72 percent (49 out of 68) of the judges made this 
choice.  This difference was statistically significant.52 
Judges, it seems, are no different from ordinary consumers in that they are 
vulnerable to the contrast effect.  Evaluating the relative credibility of expert 
witnesses is challenging, particularly since we did not provide their testimony or 
any details other than their qualifications.  But the judges in our study could easily 
tell that one of the husband’s psychiatrists (Dr. Williams) was more qualified than 
the other (Dr. Hancock).  In effect, the addition of this inferior expert changed the 
object of judgment, shifting the judges’ focus from a comparison of each party’s 
expert to a comparison of the husband’s two experts.  Because one of the hus-
band’s experts appeared clearly superior to the other, the judges’ assessment of the 
husband’s first expert increased markedly. 
Although we found strong evidence that a contrast effect influenced the 
judges in gauging the relative credibility of expert witnesses, we conducted anoth-
er study in which we were unable to elicit contrast effects in judges.  In the second 
  
49. This was roughly half of the judges in attendance at the conference.  We varied our materials slightly 
so that half of the judges responded to this problem and the other half responded to an unrelated 
scenario. 
50. Four in the control condition and two in the contrast condition did not respond. 
51. We originally presented this problem to a group of judges at an educational conference in another 
jurisdiction.  In the original version, we identified the wife’s expert as the psychiatrist and the 
husband’s experts as psychologists, one of which had vastly inferior qualifications to the other.  In 
that version, we encountered a kind of ceiling effect: In the control condition, 84 percent of the 
judges (26 out of 31) chose the husband’s expert as more credible, and, after the addition of an 
inferior expert, 93 percent (28 out of 29) of judges found the husband’s first expert most credible.  
This difference was not statistically significant (Fisher’s exact test, p = .20), because the control 
condition percentage was so high that a statistically significant difference in the contrast condition 
was virtually impossible.  Many of the judges informed us that they believed psychologists were 
better witnesses in such cases, so in later studies we rewrote the expert’s qualifications to make the 
choice in the control condition a closer call. 
52. Fisher’s exact test, p =.035.  If we combine the results from the similar, original version of the problem 
described in supra note 51, and this version, the combination also produces a significant contrast effect, 
with 63 percent (64 out of 101) choosing the husband’s expert in the control condition as compared to 
79 percent (77 out of 97) in the contrast condition.  Fisher’s exact test, p = .01. 
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study, we asked federal judges attending an educational conference sponsored by 
the Federal Judicial Center to evaluate two settlement offers.53 
The case consisted of a civil rights claim by an African-American high 
school honors student who had been shot in the back by a security guard at a 
public university where he was taking classes.54  The materials indicated that the 
university offered the plaintiff a choice between: a $1.5 million payment plus a 
commitment to fire the security guard, and a $3 million payment without a com-
mitment to fire the security guard.  Because the plaintiff was a minor, the judge 
had to approve any settlement. 
The judges learned that the student wanted to accept the lesser sum to 
ensure that the guard would get fired.  The materials ultimately asked the judge 
whether they would allow the plaintiff to accept the lesser sum.  Half of the judges 
also learned that the university initially had been willing to offer $1.5 million and 
only a suspension of the guard.55  Because this offer is comparable but inferior to 
  
53. The forty-two judges included forty-one U.S. magistrate judges and one U.S. District judge. 
54. The facts of the scenario, labeled “Settlement Problem,” consisted of the following: 
You are presiding over a settlement conference in a lawsuit filed by a minor, 
Henry Johnson, against Ted Samuelson, a campus police officer employed by the 
State University.  The suit includes a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law 
tort claims.  The University will indemnify Samuelson and has assumed the defense 
of this action. 
Johnson is a 16-year-old African-American from a poor neighborhood.  He 
lives with his four younger siblings and his mother, who works as a hotel maid.  
He has not seen his father in many years.  In January of Johnson’s junior year in 
high school, he began taking some classes at the local University, through a 
special program offered to honor students. 
While returning from the University library late one evening, Johnson was 
stopped by Officer Samuelson.  Samuelson began questioning Johnson aggressively 
in connection with an armed robbery.  Nervous and frightened, Johnson ran off.  
Samuelson shouted at him to stop.  When Johnson kept running, Samuelson shot 
Johnson in the back.  The bullet damaged Johnson’s spinal cord leaving him perma-
nently unable to walk.  The incident has left Johnson bitter and angry.  He is none-
theless determined to complete his classes at the University (which is the best public 
college in the state) and perhaps enroll as a full-time student after high school. 
Johnson’s mother is his guardian ad litem.  Between her job, managing 
Johnson’s injuries, and caring for her other four children, however, she is over-
whelmed.  She is counting largely on others to do the best for her son, and will ap-
prove any decision her son and his attorney make.  Johnson’s lawyer seems 
competent, but is inexperienced.  Neither side has actively pursued discovery, and 
both seem interested in settling.  Criminal charges against Samuelson for the 
shooting were dropped after a brief investigation. 
55. This was described as follows:  
In a previous settlement conference, Johnson insisted that the Officer Samuelson 
be disciplined and the University initially refused.  After protracted discussions, the 
University reluctantly offered to pay Johnson $1.5 million and to suspend 
Samuelson for three months without pay.  Johnson rejected that offer, and you 
adjourned the conference to give the parties a chance to reconsider their positions. 
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the final offer of $1.5 million plus firing the guard, we believed it would make the 
$1.5 million appear to be more favorable to the judges. 
All forty-two judges at the conference answered the question, but they did 
not display a contrast effect.56  In the control condition, 47.6 percent (10 out of 
21) indicated that they would allow the plaintiff to accept the $1.5 million settle-
ment, as compared to 38.1 percent (8 out of 21) in the contrast condition.  Thus, 
the addition of the earlier, less favorable settlement offer seemingly made the com-
parable settlement option slightly less attractive, although this difference was not 
statistically significant.57 
Although we think it important to report this failure to replicate the con-
trast effect in a different setting, we do not believe that it undermines the basic 
conclusion that judges are vulnerable to the contrast effect.  We modeled the settle-
ment study after contrast effects studies conducted by Kelman and his coauthors58 
and by Guthrie.59  In those studies, the addition of an inferior choice boosted 
acceptance of the choice that it most closely resembled.  Unlike those studies, 
however, we did not offer the judges the inferior choice as a third option in our 
study because we felt that our version more accurately reflected the way in which 
such settlement proposals are actually structured.  The contrast effect, however, 
might require that the inferior option remain available as a choice.  Furthermore, 
our sample size was small relative to those used in other studies, giving us only a 
limited ability to detect any effects.  It is also possible that the role in which we 
placed judges undermined the effect.  Judges were not selecting their preferred 
choice but instead were deciding whether to approve or reject the litigant’s 
decision.  Although we believe that the contrast effect should have improved the 
desirability of the option that the litigant chose, it could be that the judges were 
focused on a different object of judgment—the maturity of the litigant. 
Overall, our research suggests that, at least in some settings, judges are 
vulnerable to the contrast effect.  This result suggests an insidious litigation 
strategy—proffer a weak expert to make your good expert look better.  That 
sounds ridiculous, but in real-world settings other than the courtroom, pro-
fessionals use the contrast effect in ways that seem equally silly.  For example, real 
estate agents reportedly show their clients houses that are wildly inferior on some 
dimension that is important to homebuyers in order to make the target home seem 
like a good buy in comparison.60  Similarly, manufacturers often offer extremely 
  
56. The forty-two judges included forty-one U.S. magistrate judges and one U.S. district judge. 
57. Fisher’s exact test, p = .75. 
58. Kelman et al., supra note 38. 
59. Guthrie, supra note 46, at 617–19. 
60. See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 14 (4th ed. 2001). 
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high-end (and high-priced) versions of their products that they do not expect to 
sell in order to increase sales of more moderately priced products.61  If such dis-
tractions can affect homebuyers and consumers when they are making serious de-
cisions, then judges might be just as vulnerable. 
The contrast effect might also explain why lawyers sometimes deliberately 
include weak arguments in their briefs to accompany potentially winning argu-
ments.  The weak arguments might make the tenable ones seem stronger by con-
trast.  The effectiveness of this strategy is dubious, however, because including 
weak arguments might also undermine the lawyer’s credibility.  In any event, both 
consumer studies and our own research demonstrate that judges can be susceptible 
to the contrast effect.  The lesson these studies teach is that adding seemingly 
irrelevant information can alter the focus of judges’ attention, so the decision about 
whether to do it should be carefully considered.  
III. IMAGING THE NUMERATOR 
We have argued elsewhere that judges, like most adults, use two distinct cog-
nitive systems to make judgments: an intuitive system founded largely on affective 
processes (System 1) and a deliberative system founded largely on deductive pro-
cesses (System 2).62  The intuitive system is surprisingly accurate,63 but it can lead 
to predictable errors in judgment when relied upon in the wrong circumstances.  
Because the intuitive system is faster than the deductive system, good judgment 
often requires a person to suppress an intuitive response and substitute a more 
deliberative response.64  We have found that judges sometimes suppress mislead-
ing intuitive responses, but that they do not do so consistently.65 
When asked to make judgments based on probabilistic information, people 
often rely on intuitive processes and gut feelings rather than on their deliberative 
and deductive faculties.  This tendency manifests itself in multiple ways.  One 
common way is through the process of “imaging the numerator,” which consists 
of basing judgment on the size of a numerator in a fraction, while neglecting the 
denominator.66 
  
61. See Simonson & Tversky, supra note 35, at 293–94. 
62. Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench, supra note 9, at 6–9. 
63. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 12–
13 (2005). 
64. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 28 (2011) (describing deliberative 
reasoning as an effortful attempt to overcome mistakes that snap judgments can produce). 
65. Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench, supra note 9. 
66. See Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 397, 413 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (“We can characterize 
Epstein’s subjects as following a mental strategy of ‘imaging the numerator’ . . . .”).  Others have 
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The so-called jellybean study by Epstein and Kirkpatrick provides a notable 
example of imaging the numerator.67  In this study, the researchers told subjects 
that they would receive a prize if they drew a red jellybean from one of two jars 
filled with red and white jellybeans.  One jar contained one red and nine white 
jellybeans, while the other contained ten red and ninety white jellybeans.  Even 
though the probability of drawing a red jelly bean from each jar was identical, 
subjects preferred to draw from the jar containing ten red jellybeans.  The research-
ers argued that the subjects’ intuitive systems reacted to the impression that the 
jar containing ten red jellybeans offered more opportunities to win, thereby ig-
noring the fact that this jar also provided a proportionate number of chances to 
lose.  The subjects’ self-reports confirmed the researchers’ hypothesis, as subjects 
claimed that they relied on their feelings rather than on the odds.  One subject 
explained: “I picked the ones with more red jelly beans because it looked like 
there were more ways to get a winner, even though I knew there were also more 
whites, and that the percents were against me.”68  So powerful was this intuition 
that subjects even preferred the larger bowl when it contained less than ten red 
jellybeans.69 
Research by John Monahan and Eric Silver suggests that the phenomenon 
of imaging the numerator also affects judges.70  They gave judges descriptions of 
hypothetical individuals suffering from mental illness and asked them whether 
they would commit the individuals involuntarily to an institution.  They described 
each individual’s condition and diagnosis and asked judges to identify how great 
the risk of violence would have to be before they would commit the individual.  
The judges were asked to select one of five levels of risk: 1 percent, 8 percent, 26 
percent, 56 percent, or 76 percent.  When the researchers presented the risk of 
violence in a probabilistic format, the modal threshold for commitment was 26 
  
termed this phenomenon “denominator neglect.”  See, e.g., Rocio Garcia-Retamero et al., Do Icon 
Arrays Help Reduce Denominator Neglect?, 30 MED. DECISION MAKING 672, 680 (2010) (ex-
plaining that people “often pay too much attention to numerators and insufficient attention to 
denominators”). 
67. Lee A. Kirkpatrick & Seymour Epstein, Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory and Subjective Probability: 
Further Evidence for Two Conceptual Systems, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 534, 540–
42 (1992). 
68. Veronika Denes-Raj & Seymour Epstein, Conflict Between Intuitive and Rational Processing: 
When People Behave Against Their Better Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 819, 
823 (1994).  
69. Id. at 822 (“[A] majority (61%) preferred the large bowl that offered a 9% probability of winning 
over the small bowl, with its constant offering of a 10% chance of winning.  A substantial number 
of subjects (23%) selected the large over the small bowl when it offered only half the chance (5% vs. 
10%) of winning.”).  
70. John Monahan & Eric Silver, Judicial Decision Thresholds for Violence Risk Management, 2 INT’L J. 
FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 1, 4 (2003). 
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percent.  When the researchers presented the risks in a frequentist format (that 
is, one in one hundred, eight in one hundred, twenty-six in one hundred, fifty-
six in one hundred, or seventy-six in one hundred), however, the modal threshold 
dropped to eight in one hundred.  Presenting the risk of violence in a frequentist 
format encouraged the judges to think of the person as violent.  The authors liken 
this effect to imaging the numerator.  The risk of violence seems greater when it is 
described as eight in one hundred times rather than as 8 percent of the time. 
Although the differences observed in the Monahan and Silver study were 
not statistically significant,71 the result is comparable to the differences observed 
by forensic experts who participated in similar studies.72  In one such study, for 
example, researchers asked clinical psychologists to indicate whether they would 
be willing to recommend committing a potentially violent individual.73 Among 
the experts who were told that 8 percent of people with this individual’s condition 
commit a violent act, 39 percent of them stated that they would recommend 
committing him.74  Among the experts who learned that eight out of one hundred 
people with this individual’s condition commit a violent act, 61 percent stated 
that they would commit him.75 
In similar work, Jay Koehler has demonstrated that presenting the same 
information in frequentist format instead of probabilistic format can affect ordinary 
adults acting as jurors in a criminal case.76  Koehler gave mock jurors a one-page 
description of a murder case in which a prosecutor presented testimony involving a 
forensic technique known as polymerace chain reaction (PCR) matching—a 
simple form of DNA matching.77  Koehler informed the mock jurors that this PCR 
technique had revealed that blood from the crime scene matched that of the de-
fendant.  Koehler further apprised them of the likelihood that an innocent person 
randomly drawn from the community at large would also match the crime scene 
blood.  He presented this probability either as 0.1 percent (probabilistic format) or 
  
71. Id.  Although the authors do not report test statistics, they do report the raw data, which enabled us 
to conduct an order logistic regression, which confirmed that the trend was not significant (p = .38).  
The authors only had twenty-six judges available for the study, which was unlikely to detect the 
difference that researchers have found between presentations in probabilistic format and frequentist 
format in other contexts. 
72. See Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication: The Effects of Using Actual 
Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing Probability Versus Frequency Formats, 24 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 271 (2000). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Jonathan J. Koehler, The Psychology of Numbers in the Courtroom: How to Make DNA-Match Statistics 
Seem Impressive or Insufficient, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1302–03 (2001). 
77. Id. at 1287 n.36.  The text of Koehler’s scenario is included as Appendix B. 
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as 1 in 1,000 (frequentist format).78  Koehler found that subjects who saw the stat-
istic presented in probabilistic format were more likely to conclude that the blood at 
the crime scene had come from the defendant than those who saw the statistic in 
frequentist format.  Those exposed to the statistic in probabilistic format, however, 
did not also express a greater willingness to convict the defendant.  Koehler’s re-
sults confirm that the frequentist format makes it easier to imagine that many 
individuals would match the blood type.  In contrast, the probabilistic format 
makes it easier to commit the “prosecutor’s fallacy,”79 in which the decisionmaker 
mistakenly assumes that 0.1 percent refers to the probability that the defendant is 
innocent.  In other words, people deploying their deductive faculties to evaluate 
information will see information presented in these two formats as identical, 
while those relying on their intuitive faculties are more likely to interpret the 
frequentist presentation as suggesting innocence and the probabilistic presen-
tation as suggesting guilt.80 
These studies produce clear recommendations for lawyers: Prosecutors 
should generally present statistics in a probabilistic format, and criminal defense 
attorneys should generally present statistics in a frequentist format.  Each format 
highlights a slightly different aspect of the same statistical evidence.  The prob-
abilistic format induces people to believe that the evidence strongly supports guilt.  
People exposed to the probabilistic format must thus decide how firmly they 
believe in forensic testimony.  Conversely, the frequentist format invites people to 
imagine a large number of potentially innocent people who might also match the 
evidence.  People exposed to statistics in the frequentist format must then con-
sider, in light other facts surrounding the case, whether the defendant is one of 
the many innocents or the perpertrator.  In short, by thoughtfully selecting the 
format in which they present evidence, litigators may effectively be able to shift 
the object of decisionmakers’ analyses and thereby alter case outcomes. 
To assess whether this same effect would be observed in trial judges, we 
presented Koehler’s materials to three groups of trial judges at various state edu-
  
78. Id. at 1288.  Koehler also varied the specificity of the population of potential innocents.  He stated 
this either in a general way (e.g., “the probability that the suspect would match the blood sample if 
he were not the source is 0.1%”) or by identifying a specific population (e.g., “0.1% of people in 
Houston would also match the blood drops”).  In our study, reported below, we also varied this 
parameter, but we found it had little effect on the judges.  Hence, we do not discuss it in detail. 
79. See William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in 
Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
167, 170–71 (1987). 
80. See Leila Schneps & Coralie Colmez, Justice Flunks Math, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/opinion/when-judges-cant-do-math-justice-suffers.html 
(“Miscalculation  by judges and lawyers of probabilities, from the odds of DNA matches to the 
chance of accidental death, have sent innocent people to jail, and, perhaps, let murderers walk free.”). 
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cational conferences, including 68 judges from an urban Eastern jurisdiction,81 
120 judges from Ohio, and 88 California judges.82  We presented each of the 
judges with one of four versions of Koehler’s scenario.  Two versions presented 
the likelihood of matching in probabilistic (0.1 percent) format, and the other two 
presented it in frequentist (1 in 1000) format.  This variation was crossed with the 
degree of specificity of the sample from which the innocent matches might be 
drawn (matching in general or matching people from the jurisdiction).  Follow-
ing Koehler, we asked the judges three questions about the fact pattern: 
(1) Based on this evidence, what is the probability that the 
defendant is the source of the recovered DNA trace?  ___ percent 
(2) Based on this evidence, what is the probability that the 
defendant is guilty of the murder of Mr. Oden?  ___ percent 
(3) Based on this evidence, how would you find the defendant 
(assuming a bench trial)?  (Guilty or Not Guilty) 
As to the first two questions, the judges’ results mirrored Koehler’s findings.  
Judges presented with the frequentist format indicated, on average, that the like-
lihood that the defendant was the perpetrator was 48 percent, whereas judges 
presented with the probabilistic format indicated, on average, that the likelihood 
of a match was 72 percent.83  This difference was statistically significant.84  Judges’ 
responses regarding the probability that the defendant had committed the crime 
echoed this result.  Judges in the frequentist condition assigned an average proba-
bility of guilt of 51 percent, as opposed to 69 percent of those in the probabilistic 
condition.  This difference was also statistically significant.85 
These assessments, however, did not affect the judges’ verdicts.  Among the 
judges who saw the frequentist presentation, 46 percent indicated that they would 
find the defendant guilty as opposed to 53 percent of the judges who saw the prob-
  
81. These judges preferred not to have their jurisdiction identified.  Three judges declined to allow us to 
use their results for any further discussion, and the results from these judges have been omitted from 
all analysis. 
82. At each of these conferences, we presented at a plenary session. 
83. Overall, 144 judges reviewed the frequentist presentation and 132 reviewed the probability 
presentation.  Among judges reviewing the frequentist presentation twenty-four, thirty-four, and 
three declined to answer the questions concerning the probability that the defendant was the 
source, the probability that the defendant was guilty, and the verdict.  Among judges reviewing 
the probability presentation twenty-nine, forty, and ten declined to answer these questions, 
respectively. 
84. F(1,219) = 17.39, p < .001.  Specificity (general versus specific location) and the interaction between 
specificity and format were not significant (F = 0.67 and F = 0.51, respectively). 
85. F(1,198) = 10.02, p = .002.  Specificity (general versus specific city) and the interaction between 
specificity and format were not significant (F = 0.89 and F = 0.38, respectively). 
Attention In Adjudication 1609 
 
 
abilistic presentation.  This difference is not significant.86  This disparity between 
the judges’ willingness to convict and their assessment of the probability of the 
defendant’s guilt also parallels Koehler’s finding with lay adults.87 
The results suggest an interesting dichotomy.  Judges (and lay adults) were 
influenced by the format in which statistical evidence was presented.  They as-
sessed the facts differently and reported that they were more persuaded by the ev-
idence when it was presented in the probabilistic format.  Nonetheless, the 
format did not affect the judges’ willingness to convict the defendant.  This result 
suggests that when judges are asked to render a verdict on guilt rather than to 
merely assess probability of guilt, they shift from reliance on intuition to a more 
deliberative cognitive process.  Rendering a verdict likely encourages a more care-
ful analysis of the evidence, because the risk of a wrongful conviction reduces the 
judge’s confidence in police, prosecutors, and the evidence in general.88  For judges, 
determining the verdict presents a different question than does assessing the 
probability of a blood match. 
Notably, the fact that we—and Koehler—observed a small trend towards 
greater conviction in the probabilistic format suggests that we might not have had 
enough statistical power to detect an effect on a binary outcome, like guilt.  
Koehler, in fact, suggests as much and cites a similar study in which a significant 
effect was observed on guilt.89  Nevertheless, the influence of the format on ver-
dicts appears to be smaller than the influence of the format on probability assess-
ments.  Judges and jurors have to be confident of guilt to convict and likely spend 
more cognitive effort assessing guilt than making probability estimates.  This ef-
fort tends to produce more reliable judgments. 
IV. SUPPRESSED CONFESSIONS: POLICING THE POLICE 
Our final study examines a situation in which judges are under cognitive 
pressure to rely on an untoward influence—that of suppressed evidence.  In 
bench trials, motions, and sentencings, judges can sometimes find themselves in 
the awkward position of having to determine what evidence to admit and then 
having to attempt to disregard the evidence that they have excluded.  Juries have a 
  
86. Fisher’s exact test, p = .61. 
87. Koehler found that 32 percent of those who read the frequency format convicted, but 36 percent of 
those who read the probability format convicted.  Koehler, supra note 76, at 1289. 
88. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1378 (1985) (“[T]he correlation between probability and acceptability is not 
exact.”). 
89. Koehler, supra note 76, at 1289 n.40. 
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luxury in this regard, in that they are commonly (although certainly not always) 
shielded from any knowledge of the excluded evidence. 
In a previous paper, we demonstrated that judges are often influenced by 
evidence even after they have ruled it inadmissible.90  We also identified two cir-
cumstances in which judges seemed able to disregard inadmissible evidence.  First, 
judges ignored the outcome of a search when making probable cause assess-
ments,91 and, second, judges seemed unaffected by a reliable but illegally obtained 
confession.92  We follow up on this latter finding here. 
In our previous experiment, we asked judges to decide whether they would 
find a criminal defendant guilty or innocent in a bench trial.  We provided all of 
the judges with a scenario containing rather weak evidence as to the guilt of a 
defendant charged with robbing a convenience store.  We informed half of the 
judges that the defendant had provided a reliable confession to the crime but that 
the confession was obtained two hours after the defendant had asked for a lawyer—
a request that the police had ignored.  When we asked these judges to rule on the 
admissibility of this confession, almost all of the judges ruled the confession inad-
missible.93  Surprisingly, they also appeared to ignore it when deciding whether to 
convict.  Judges who learned of the confession and suppressed it were no more 
likely to convict the defendant than the other half of the judges who had never 
heard the confession.94 
We wondered how judges managed to accomplish this cognitively chal-
lenging task.  Anecdotal comments from the judges who participated in the study 
provided a few clues as to what might have accounted for their apparent ability to 
disregard the relevant but inadmissible confession.  Judges noted that the crime 
was “only a robbery,” no one was hurt, and that not much cash was stolen.  Thus, 
the cost of suppressing the evidence—a lost conviction for a relatively minor 
crime—was lower than it would have been for a more serious crime.  The judges 
also expressed annoyance at the police officers’ blatant disregard of constitutional 
rights. 
Such comments suggest that the judges did not truly ignore the inad-
missible confession but rather discounted its importance under the circumstances 
by weighing the cost of suppression against the degree of police misconduct.  If 
  
90. Wistrich et al., supra note 9, at 1286–1324. 
91. Id. at 1313–18.  We explored this result in exhaustive detail in Rachlinski et al., Probable Cause, supra 
note 9. 
92. Wistrich et al., supra note 9, at 1318–22. 
93. Id. at 1321 n.278. 
94. Id. at 1321.  Although 20.7 percent of the judges convicted when exposed to the inadmissible 
confession and only 17.7 percent convicted in the control condition, that difference was not statisti-
cally significant.  Id. 
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that inference is correct, then both the gravity of the crime and the severity of po-
lice misconduct could influence conviction rates.  To test this theory, we used a 
similar fact pattern, but we altered it by varying both the gravity of the crime and 
the severity of the police misconduct.  The new hypothetical case contained a 2x3 
design in which we crossed the gravity of the crime (armed robbery or murder) 
and the severity of the police misconduct (none, mild or severe).  We tested 
whether either or both factors would influence conviction rates. 
We created two crime fact patterns modeled after our earlier study.  One 
involved a bank robbery, while the other involved a bank robbery that included a 
murder.  All versions of the problem, labeled “Evaluation of a Robbery Trial,” 
included the following facts (additional facts present only in the robbery-turned-
murder version are noted in brackets): 
Mr. Simson is on trial for bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 
[MURDER: and a related murder].  Mr. Simson has waived his right 
to a jury trial.  You are thus presiding in a bench trial.  The following 
summarizes the evidence presented at trial: 
In the early morning, an armed assailant wearing jeans, a white t-
shirt, a ski mask, and black gloves entered a small branch of First Federal 
Bank (a federally insured bank), ordered everyone onto the ground, and 
demanded that a teller put money in a plastic shopping bag.  The teller 
complied, quickly emptying $520 that she had just received from a 
customer into the bag.  As she reached for more money, the perpetrator 
ran off.  The robbery was captured on a surveillance camera videotape. 
[MURDER: On his way out of the bank, the perpetrator stum-
bled into a young woman pushing a stroller with her infant son.  Startled, 
the perpetrator fired at the woman twice, killing her instantly.  The child 
was unharmed.] 
When police arrived, the teller reported that once outside the 
bank, the perpetrator pulled off his ski mask, discarding both it and the 
gun as he climbed quickly into a white Ford Taurus, and sped off.  Po-
lice retrieved the gun and mask; neither had usable fingerprints.  The 
gun was unloaded.  The gun had been reported stolen several years 
earlier by its original owner, who is now deceased. 
Several police officers then began a search of the neighborhood for 
a white Ford Taurus.  Two hours after the crime, they found one, parked 
10 blocks from the crime scene.  The Department of Motor Vehicle 
records identified the owner as the defendant.  The police knocked on 
the door to his apartment.  The defendant matched the height, weight, 
and race of the perpetrator in the surveillance videotape, although he 
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was wearing different clothing.  The police then insisted that the defen-
dant accompany them to the stationhouse to answer questions, which 
he did. 
Upon arrival, the police led him to a room, locked the door, read 
him his Miranda rights, and began interrogating him.  The defendant 
reported that he had been home alone all morning.  The police allowed 
the teller to listen in from the next room.  The teller reportedly said “that 
sounds like the guy.”  The police then placed the defendant under 
arrest.  They obtained a search warrant and searched his apartment.  
They found shopping bags similar to the one used by the perpetrator of 
the crime, a pair of black gloves, and clothing matching that of the perp-
etrator (white t-shirt and jeans) in the washing machine.  The defen-
dant also had nearly six hundred dollars in cash in his apartment.  The 
police did not find firearms or ammunition of any kind. 
In the two versions not containing a confession, the materials ended by 
noting: “The police continued questioning the defendant, but he requested a 
lawyer and the interrogation ended.”  Then the materials asked: “Based solely on 
the evidence admitted at trial, would you convict the defendant?” 
In the two versions involving mild police misconduct, the story instead 
continued as follows: 
The police continued questioning the defendant.  Even though 
the defendant clearly requested a lawyer, twice, the police refused to call 
one and continued the interrogation.  Two hours later, the defendant 
confessed and agreed to write out a description of the crime.  His 
written description matched the events perfectly, including the fact that 
he discarded the ski mask and gun outside the store (which the police 
had not told him).  The entire interrogation was recorded with both 
video and audio. 
In the two versions involving severe police misconduct, the story continued 
in a different manner: 
The police continued to interrogate the defendant.  During the en-
tire interrogation, they had denied the defendant access to the restroom, 
and he ultimately soiled his clothing.  One officer had threatened the 
defendant and “pushed him around.”  After nine hours of this treatment, 
the defendant confessed and agreed to write out a description of the 
crime.  His written description matched the events perfectly, including 
the fact that he discarded the ski mask and gun outside the store (which 
the police had not told him).  The entire interrogation was recorded with 
both video and audio. 
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Finally, in the four versions in which the defendant confessed, the materials 
went on to state: 
The defendant’s attorney has moved to suppress the confession, 
arguing that the interrogation violated the defendant’s rights under 
Miranda by continuing after the defendant had requested an attorney.  
Would you grant the motion and suppress the evidence? 
After obtaining the ruling, the materials then asked: “Based solely on the 
evidence admitted at trial, would you convict the defendant?” 
We presented this scenario at multiple judicial education conferences in 
order to obtain enough data to fill out all six conditions; in all, 81 U.S. district 
judges, 44 U.S. magistrate judges, 101 Florida state trial judges, and 88 California 
state trial court judges responded to this scenario—for a total of 314 judges. 
Excluding the small group of judges who declined to suppress the evidence,95 
Table 2 below reports the conviction rates by condition:96 
 
TABLE 2.  Percent Convicting by Condition 
 No Confession Mild Police Misconduct
Severe Police 
Misconduct Total 
Robbery 29.6 (13/44) 43.1 (22/51) 28.3 (15/53) 33.8 (50/148) 
Murder 24.0 (12/50) 36.0 (18/50) 44.0 (22/50) 34.7 (52/150) 
Total 26.6 (25/94) 39.6 (40/101) 35.9 (37/103) 34.2 (102/298) 
 
Unlike our previous study, the confession affected the judges’ verdicts, 
although this effect varied with the gravity of the crime and the severity of the 
police misconduct.  In the absence of a confession, the gravity of the crime did not 
affect the conviction rate significantly; roughly one in four judges convicted in 
both the murder and robbery scenarios.97  When the police engaged in a minor 
  
95. Seven judges in total admitted the confession.  These consisted of one district judge who convicted 
in the murder, severe misconduct condition; one district judge who acquitted in the robbery, severe 
misconduct condition; one magistrate judge who convicted in the robbery, mild misconduct 
condition; one Florida judge who acquitted in the murder, mild misconduct condition; one Florida 
judge who convicted in the murder, mild misconduct condition; one Florida judge who convicted 
in the robbery, mild misconduct condition; and one California judge who convicted in the robbery, 
mild misconduct condition. 
96. Nine judges gave no verdict, including six Florida judges (one robbery, no confession condition; one 
robbery, mild misconduct condition; one robbery, severe misconduct condition; one murder, mild 
misconduct condition;  two murder, severe misconduct condition) and three California judges (one 
robbery, mild misconduct condition; one murder, mild misconduct condition; one murder, severe 
misconduct condition). 
97. Fisher’s exact test, p = .642. 
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violation of the defendant’s rights, the judges were influenced by the confession; 
even though they suppressed the confession, they were more likely to convict the 
defendant.98  Interestingly, the gravity of the crime did not affect the conviction 
rate in the mild misconduct scenarios.99  When the police misconduct was severe, 
however, the conviction rate dropped slightly for the robbery (albeit not signif-
icantly),100 and rose slightly for the murder.101 
Analyzing the results using logistic regression revealed that, overall, the 
gravity of the crime had no significant effect,102 the presence of a confession had a 
marginally significant effect,103 the severe police misconduct produced a slightly 
lower conviction rate than the mild police misconduct,104 and the crime by con-
fession interaction was not significant.105  Notably, however, the interaction between 
the crime and the severity of the police misconduct was significant.106  In effect, the 
presence of a confession and the severity of the police misconduct affected the 
judges differently for each crime.  For the robbery, the confession after mild mis-
conduct increased the conviction rate, but the conviction rate returned to the 
baseline rate when the police misconduct was severe.  For the murder, the con-
fession after mild misconduct increased the conviction rate, and the conviction 
rate remained higher even when the police misconduct was severe. 
These results show that judges are not, in fact, able to ignore a confession.  
Rather, both the confession—and the degree of police misconduct that produced 
it—factor into the judge’s ultimate decision.  More severe police misconduct re-
duced the judges’ willingness to convict—but only for a less serious crime.  When 
the defendant had committed murder, the judges were less willing to punish the 
same police misconduct with lower conviction rates—rather, the judges who had 
heard confessions, however obtained, were consistently more willing to convict.  It 
is noteworthy that, even while making this complex judgment, the judges followed 
the law exceptionally well—almost all of the judges recognized that the con-
fessions were clearly illegally obtained and suppressed them.  But the judges also 
took two extralegal steps.  They convicted the defendant more often when they 
learned of (and suppressed) the confession, and they punished severe police mis-
  
98. Collapsing across both crimes, the conviction rate in the confession condition in which police 
misconduct was mild (39.6 percent) was marginally significantly higher than the conviction rate 
when there was no confession (26.6 percent).  Fisher’s exact test, p = .07. 
99. Fisher’s exact test, p = .54. 
100. Fisher’s exact test, p = .15. 
101. Fisher’s exact test, p = .54. 
102. z = .61, p =.54. 
103. z = 1.68, p =.09. 
104. z = 1.98, p =.05. 
105. z = .20, p =.85. 
106. z = 2.03, p =.04. 
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conduct not only by suppressing the conviction (which the law obliges them to do) 
but also by reducing their willingness to convict the defendant (when the crime 
was only a robbery). 
The object of judgment in this hypothetical case was a combination of the 
underlying facts, the additional confession, the underlying crime, and the severity 
of police misconduct.  If the judges had truly been ignoring the confession, only 
the underlying facts would have affected their judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Cases are often complicated.107  Judges, who suffer from the same cognitive 
limitations as the rest of us, cannot possibly give each aspect of a complicated case 
the same degree of consideration—especially not while under pressure to render a 
quick decision.  Inevitably, some aspects of a case influence a judge more than 
others.  Therefore, the quality of justice may depend on the object of the judge’s 
attention. 
In this Article, we have shown various ways in which shifting the locus of a 
judge’s attention can alter the judge’s analytical process and ultimate judgment.  
Collectively, our studies show that presenting judges with additional information 
or altering the way in which information is presented can affect judges’ decisions.  
For example, making the burden that incarceration poses on the state more 
salient to a judge can inject new, utilitarian considerations into the judge’s de-
cisionmaking process and change sentencing outcomes.  Similarly, the format in 
which statistical information is presented can shift a judge’s attention from the 
likelihood of guilt to the likelihood of innocence—and vice versa.  In this sense, 
judges are akin to officials in a basketball game.  The fouls an official calls during 
a game depends on the particular players that the official happens to be watching 
at a critical moment.  If an official keeps his eye on the ball-handler on the perim-
eter, he might miss a foul under the basket; if he focuses on the rebounders under 
the basket, he might miss a travel or double dribble by the ball-handler on the 
perimeter.  Likewise, a judge’s inferences, evidentiary determinations, rulings on 
motions, and criminal sentences might turn on which aspects of the case capture 
the judge’s attention at the time she renders her decision. 
This has obvious implications for litigators and their clients.  Because of case 
complexity, heavy caseloads, and cognitive constraints, judges tend to focus their 
  
107. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS’S MIT LECTURES ON LAW (1892–1894), at 247–48 
(Robert F. Cochran, Jr. ed., 2012) (“[Q]uestions instead of being simple, so that it is clear who is in 
the right, are extremely complicated; it is often impossible to tell who is either legally or morally 
right, until the case is tried out in court, and the decision rendered by the proper tribunal.”). 
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attention on some aspects of a case and to neglect others.  A good lawyer will at-
tempt to steer a judge’s attention in a direction that benefits that lawyer’s case.  For 
example, defense counsel might mention the costs of incarceration or highlight 
shady police conduct.  Defense attorneys might also seek to present data in a 
frequentist format to highlight the likelihood of innocence, while prosecutors can 
increase the likelihood of a conviction by presenting statistical data in a prob-
abilistic format.  Further, litigators should be mindful that the presence of less 
credible experts or percipient witnesses can influence judges’ assessments of other 
expert or percipient witnesses. 
The adversarial system places judges in a challenging position.  It makes 
them dependent upon litigants for information, so much so that judges have been 
likened to oysters who can absorb only what happens to be provided to them.108  
Even a managerial judge109 cannot entirely control what is presented to him or her, 
or the format in which it is presented.  This may leave judges vulnerable to dis-
traction, misdirection, and manipulation.  Like the magician’s mark, their attention 
may be shifted to the wrong place at the wrong time, rendering them susceptible 
to sophistry.  The rules of evidence and procedure are designed to mitigate this 
danger, but they have achieved limited success.  They fail to regulate many 
situations in which the decisionmaker is vulnerable to attention-shifting mech-
anisms,110 and even regulated areas—such as questions of the admissibility of 
evidence—they imperfectly safeguard the decisionmaker’s impartiality.111  Collec-
tively, our experiments suggest that, although judges are vulnerable to misdi-
rection techniques, they sometimes do succeed in keeping their eyes on the ball. 
  
108. Calvert Magruder, Mr. Justice Brandeis, 55 HARV. L. REV. 193, 194 (1941) (“The position of a 
judge has been likened to that of an oyster—anchored in one place, unable to take the initiative, 
unable to go out after things, restricted to working on and digesting what the fortuitous eddies and 
currents of litigation may wash his way.”). 
109. See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
110.  For example, they do not prescribe the format in which statistical evidence must be presented (or 
require that it be presented in multiple formats), tightly restrict what counsel can present in closing 
argument, and so on. 
111. For example, they do not prohibit attorneys form proffering inadmissible evidence or bar judges 
from presiding over settlement conferences in their own cases. 
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APPENDIX A: TRUTH IN SENTENCING SCENARIO 
State v. Campbell [Rape] 
Imagine you are presiding over a rape case. 
Hector Campbell, an unemployed drummer, was arrested at a party for al-
legedly raping his ex-girlfriend at knifepoint.  Hector was charged with rape.  The 
evidence at trial, which included testimony from the girlfriend and two other 
witnesses, showed convincingly that he did commit the rape.  Hector is 24-years-
old and has a high school diploma and a spotty employment record.  He has one 
prior conviction for assault and battery. 
In your jurisdiction, rape involving an aggravating factor like the use of a 
deadly weapon carries a maximum prison sentence of 25 years.  [You have learned 
from your jurisdiction’s sentencing advisory commission that Hector's incarcer-
ation will cost the state $387,500/$775,000 if he were to serve the maximum 
sentence ($15,500/$31,000 per year).] 
Based solely on these facts, what sentence will you impose on Hector? 
 
State v. Campbell [Drug possession] 
Imagine you are presiding over a drug possession case. 
Hector Campbell, an unemployed drummer, was arrested at a party for 
allegedly possessing 150 grams of methamphetamine.  Hector was charged with 
drug possession.  The evidence at trial which included testimony from an un-
dercover police officer and two other witnesses, showed convincingly that he had 
methamphetamine in his possession.  Hector is 24-years-old and has a high school 
diploma and a spotty employment record.  He has one prior conviction for pos-
session of marijuana. 
In your jurisdiction, methamphetamine possession without intent to sell car-
ries a maximum prison sentence of 8 years.  [You have learned from your juris-
diction's sentencing advisory commission that Hector's incarceration will cost the 
state $124,000/$248,000 if he were to serve the maximum sentence ($15,500/ 
$31,000 per year).] 
Based solely on these facts, what sentence will you impose on Hector? 
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APPENDIX B: FORENSIC EVIDENCE PROBLEM 
Imagine that you are presiding over People v. Nethers, a criminal case.  In 
People v. Nethers, Steven Nethers was accused of murdering Richard Oden during 
an attempted robbery of a hardware store owned by Mr. Oden.  According to re-
liable eyewitness accounts, the perpetrator entered Mr. Oden’s hardware store at 
approximately 4:30 p.m. on November 2, 1997 wearing a Halloween-type of mask, 
and waving a small caliber handgun.  The perpetrator approached Mr. Oden (who 
was behind the cash register) and said, “Open it fast or you’re a dead man.”  
According to the eyewitnesses, when the perpetrator turned his head to survey 
the store, Mr. Oden grabbed a hammer from the counter and smashed the 
perpetrator on the head with a single blow.  The perpetrator fired a single shot 
into Mr. Oden’s chest and fled the store.  Mr. Oden died shortly thereafter in a 
local hospital. 
During an investigation of the hardware store crime scene, the police 
identified and recovered several moist blood drops from the path that was taken 
by the perpetrator as he fled the store.  These drops were subjected to a form of 
DNA analysis called PCR testing.  The PCR tests revealed the blood to be of a 
type known as “2, 3.”  Because this blood type was different from Mr. Oden’s 
blood type, police believed that the recovered blood drops came from the bleed-
ing head of the robber.  During routine interviews of people who live in the neigh-
borhood, the police identified several potential suspects.  All of these individuals 
agreed to provide blood samples to police for comparison with blood that was re-
covered from the crime scene.  One of the suspects, Mr. Steven Nethers, matched 
the 2, 3 blood type and was arrested for the murder. 
At trial, the prosecution alleged that the blood analysis demonstrated Mr. 
Nethers was the source of the wet blood drops, and that he was therefore guilty of 
attempted robbery and murder.  A DNA expert testified that his tests could not 
rule out Mr. Nethers as a possible source of the blood drops.  He also testified 
that the probability that the suspect would match the blood sample if he were not 
the source is [0.1 percent/ 1 in 1,000].  The defense argued that the blood evi-
dence is irrelevant because there was no direct evidence, such as eyewitness iden-
tifications, that linked Mr. Nethers to these crimes. 
 
